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Abstract—Data is central to the Internet of Things (IoT)
ecosystem. Most of the current IoT systems are using centralized
cloud-based data sharing systems. Involvement of such third-
party service provider requires also trust from both sensor owner
and sensor data user. Moreover, the fees need to be paid for their
services. To tackle both the scalability and trust issues and to
automatize the payments, this paper presents a blockchain based
proxy re-encryption scheme. The system stores the IoT data in
a distributed cloud after encryption. To share the collected IoT
data, the system establishes runtime dynamic smart contracts
between the sensor and the data user without the involvement of
a trusted third party. It also uses an efficient proxy re-encryption
scheme which allows that the data is only visible by the owner and
the person present in the smart contract. The proposed system
is implemented in an Ethereum based testbed to analyze the
performance and security properties.
Index Terms—Proxy Re-Encryption, Blockchain, Smart Con-
tracts, IoT Data Sharing, Security, Ethereum
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology
which has great technical, social, and economic significance.
Current predictions for the impact of IoT are very impressive.
With the development of 5G, it is anticipating that 100 billion
connected IoT devices will be used by 2025 [1], [2]. It will
also have a global economic impact of more than $11 trillion
[3] [4]-
Data is central to the IoT paradigm. IoT data is collected
to serve many different types of applications such as smaIt
home, smart city, wearable, healthcare, smart grid, autonomous
vehicles, smart farms, industries and manufacturing, and retail
sector [4]—[6]. Therefore, numerous heterogeneous sensors ex-
ist to measure a variety of parameters. The collected data from
these IoT sensors can be useful for different stakeholders. For
instance, air quality measurements are of interest to govern-
mental organizations, application developers and inhabitants
of the relevant spaces. However, many challenges alise when
organizing this data sharing as these IoT devices, which are
typically resource-constrained, require efficient mechanisms to
guarantee the data integrity and to enable proper processing
and security [7]. Due to the large number of IoT devices,
scalable deployment, and maintenance costs [5] should also
be taken into account. Currently, almost all the sensor systems
upload the data to a centralized cloud and share the sensor
data with different stakeholders, who prove access to the cloud
storage [8]. The sensors get services from the third-party cloud
service provider, such as access control in addition to the data
storage. In that case, both sensor and sensor data user have to
trust the third-party service provider and also need to pay some
fee for their services. In addition, it is needed to establish an
agreement between the third-party service provider and sensor
data user. Most of these agreements are static and take lots of
time and administration to be established [9]. It will result in
a significant increase of time before the actual data sharing
can be realized [10]. Thus, the current centralized architecture
model in IoT systems will struggle to scale up to meet the
demands of future IoT systems.
Our Contribution: To solve these issues, we propose a
novel blockchain based scheme in combination with a proxy
re-encryption mechanism to ensure the confidentiality of the
data. Here, the advantage of using blockchain mechanisms
to sell the sensor measurements with different users is that
the corresponding financial transactions are automatically
managed through the agreed smart contract, stored at the
blockchain. Moreover, the availability and other quality of
service requirements from the legal contract between both
parties can be automatically applied. Consequently, compared
to the business scenario where the data is stored in a cloud-
based infrastructure, there is no need for manual verification of
the payments and the predefined requirements. Also, disputes
on these aspects are completely avoided.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure.
Section 11 gives an overview of related work. The proposed
architecture and proxy re-encryption scheme is explained in
Section III and IV. Section V discusses the implementation of
the proposed scheme. The performance analysis results are
presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII presents our
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
There exist different studies on the security and pfivacy of
the IoT [11]—[16] and the vast majority of this research work
is on understanding and identifying these threats [17]—[21].
Moreover use of blockchain to secure various IoT Platforms
were discussed in [22]—[26]. The IoT devices sense, gather
and share a large amount of data, thus opening up significant
security and privacy concerns. Khan and Salah [27] in their
paper have reviewed different security challenges to IoT and
identified insecure transferring of IoT data as a high-level
security risk. Authors in [28] demonstrated the lack of basic
security by hacking off—the-shelf smart home IoT devices.
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [29] initially intro-
duced the concept of proxy re-encryption and constructed the
first bidirectional proxy re-encryption application. Authors in
[30], [31] also propose a similar scheme but it is not dynamic,
hence making it unsuitable for cloud data sharing. In [32], a
very efficient solution for data storage in the cloud is proposed
using a pairing free proxy re-encryption scheme. However,
the scheme is not implemented in practice. Although the
underlying structure of our proposed scheme is based on it,
some important modification like the inclusion of metadata is
included to ensure a practical usage of the scheme.
Most of the prior work partly addresses the problem of se-
curely sharing the IoT data. It is nearly impossible to come up
with device-embedded security to solve all the security threats
to the IoT devices. Limited computing and power resources of
IoT also make the execution of complex security algorithms
harder on the device. We propose using the combination of a
blockchain and a paring free proxy re-encryption scheme to
provide a trading platform and to ensure secure transfer of the
sensor data to the user.
111. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present our new architecture based on the
mechanisms of blockchain and re-encryption for secure storing
and sharing of the sensor data. We consider four entities in
the system: IoT sensors, data requester, cloud provider, and
the blockchain, as shown in Figure 1.   Sensor Owner
 
Secure Cloud
 
 
Third Party
Data Requester
Fig. 1: Proposed Architecture
1) The sensors’ owner activates the sensors, and registers
them on the blockchain Via a smart contract function.
2) After successful registration, the sensors’ owner provides
the sensor with the required key material such that the
measured data can be sent encrypted to the cloud storage
server.
3) A user requests access to one (or a group of) sensor(s)
of the owner Via the smart contract function.
4) After receiving the request, the sensors’ owner and re-
quester come to an agreement, a smart contract is gener-
ated and mined on the blockchain. The requester interacts
with the blockchain to share the public cryptographic key
and manages all the financial associated transactions.
5) On receiving the user request, cloud storage is notified
by the blockchain. The software then filters the data
according to the request.
6) Re-encryption cryptographic key from the sensor owner
is updated on the smart contract when the user request is
received.
7) Cloud server decrypts and re-encrypts filtered data, before
storing it again on a temporary location onto the cloud
server.
8) The encrypted data is temporally stored on the server and
a transaction containing the address of the stored data is
mined on the blockchain.
9) When the data is ready, the requester is notified of the
temporary location by the blockchain. The requester can
decrypt the data using its private cryptographic key.
IV. SECURITY ASPECTS
We propose to apply a Certificate Based Proxy Re-
Encryption (CB-PRE) scheme, which constitutes of seven
polynomial-time algorithms: Setup, CertifiedUserKeyGen, En-
crypt, ReKeyGen, ReEncrypt, Decryptl, and Decrypt2. We
now explain each of these phases into more detail. In our
proposal, we have combined the phases UserKeyGen and
Certify to one phase called the CertifiedUserKeyGen phase.
. SetUp(l): Given a certain security parameter I, the follow-
ing steps will be executed to derive the public parameters
params and the master secret key msk.
— First, the CA chooses an l-bit prime q. Next, an EC of
order q is generated, and a corresponding generator
point P is defined. Denote by G the group of EC
points.
— A random value oz 6 F; is chosen and Pa : aP is
computed.
— Four different hash functions are determined. H1 : G X
{0,1}32 —> F;, H2 : F; x {0,1}64 —> F;, H3 :
{0,1}64 x G —> F;, H4 : F; x {0,1}64>< —> F;.
— The public parameters are now params :
{G,q,P,Pa,H1,H2,H3,H4} and the master secret
key is put as msk : oz.
0 CertifiedUserKeyGen(pa7"ams,idU): This algorithm is
based on the Elliptic Curve Qu Vanstone (ECQV) certifi-
cate mechanism [33] and consists of the following three
phases:
— First, the involved entity idU generates a random value
TU E F; and computes RU : T00. Next the tuple
(idu, RU) is sent to the CA.
— Upon arrival, the CA checks the identity of My. Next,
it also chooses a random value rt E F; and computes
Rt : HP. Then the certificate CertU : RU + Rt
is derived. Finally, auxiliary information to derive the
private key for the involved entity is computed by Ta :
H1(CertU||idU)rt 4— oz. The tuple (ra,CertU) is sent
back.
— The involved entity computes first its private key dU :
H1(CertU||idU)rU +711. Its public key equals to PU :
dUP. If PU : H1(CertU||idU)CertU+Pa, it accepts
the key pair ((10, Pg).
Encrypt(pamms,M,idA, dA,T0): The metadata is gen-
erated for the message M, ie. meta : (idAHTO). Next,
the following computations are made.
7" = H2(dA||meta),R=7"P
CA 2 M EB H3(meta||7"PA)
hA = H4(CAHm€m)
5A 2 7" — hAdA
The output C' of this algorithm equals to C' :
(CA, meta, hA, 5A).
ReKey(pamms, dA, idB, CertB, CA, meta): First 7" :
H2(dA||meta) is derived from C'. Then, the public key of
Mg is computed as PB : H1(CertB||idB)CertB +Pa.
This leads to the definition of the ReKey as
TIME 2 H3(meta||7"PA) EB H3(meta||7"PB)
The output is the key rkAB.
ReEncrypt(pamms, CA, TIME): The re-encryption phase
changes the ciphertext CA to 03 by
CB = TkAB 63 CA
Note that 03 also corresponds to M 63 H3(meta||rPB),
which will be used in the decrypting phase of the
delegate. The output C" is now the tuple, containing
CB,meta,IDB,hA,sA.
Decrypt1(pamms,C, dA): Here the delegator wants to
decrypt the ciphertext to derive the original message
and to check its authenticity. Therefore, the following
computations are required:
7" = H2(dA||meta)
M : CA EB H3(meta||7"PA)
hA = H4(C'A||meta)
Check: 5A : 7" — hAdA
Decrypt2(pamms,C",dB): In this phase, the delegate
B derives the message M from C" by the following
operations.
R 2 SAP -|— hAPA
M 2 03 EB H3(meta||dBR)
Check: hA : H4(C'A||meta)
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Fig. 2: Overview of the Architecture Implemented
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We demonstrate the feasibility of the system design with the
prototype implementation containing a permissioned Ethereum
blockchain, IoT sensors and a cloud server for storage of the
data. Figure 2 illustrates the setup of the system with three IoT
sensors, three mining computers, five ethereum full nodes, two
regular users and one cloud storage server.
We configured and connected all the devices to the internet.
We used the auto-discovery protocol of Geth to connect the
miners and the full nodes, and configured google firebase
cloud for storage.
A. Miners
The proposed system consists of three miners that generate
a block of transactions on average every 13 seconds. These
miners are running on a Virtual machine with the same
hardware capabilities. All the mining devices were configured
to use one Ethereum wallet that collects the mining reward.
These miners are running on Geth V1.80 [34] with four mining
threads each.
B. Smart Contracts
We developed two smart contracts1 on truffle [35] and
compiled them with Solidity 0.4.24 [36]. The first smart
contract consists of the functions to register the sensor, request
data, and financial functions. The second smart contract is
dynamically created in the runtime when the user requests for
the data.
C. IOT Sensors
Each sensor TI Sensortag CC2650 connects to a Raspberry
Pi 3 Model B (RSP) through Bluetooth Low Energy, as shown
in Figure 2. This RSP manages the sensor and the Ethereum
account to perform transactions on the blockchain on behalf
of sensors. A sensor application is developed in Python
2.7.12 that connects to the sensor, performs the cryptography
functions described in the proxy re-encryption scheme on the
sensor data and uploads that data to the cloud storage server.
This application synchronizes with the blockchain using the
Python- JSON-RPC (JavaScript Object Notation - Remote
procedure Calls) library. The MAC address of each sensor acts
1 https://github.corn/ahsan 100/smart-contract
as its identity and is used for re-encryption. Once registered,
the sensor starts uploading the encrypted data to the cloud
server. It is assumed that the BLE connection between sensor
and RSP is completely secure.
D. User Application
A customized application is designed as the user interface
in Python 2.7.12, running on a Raspberry Pi 3 attached to
a touchscreen. This application uses JSON—RPC to get the
sensors’ information from the blockchain. After selecting the
required sensor, the user enters details for specifying the
data requirements. We deploy a new smart contract on the
blockchain in run-time based on the user—selected options
for the requested data (e.g. Sensor selection, Price). This
application keeps track of the Ethereum wallet along with
ECC [37] secret key of the data requester. The application
downloads the data from the cloud server, checks for the
signature and integrity, and decrypts the requested data.
E. Cloud Storage Server
The cloud storage server consists of the RSP and the Google
Firebase. RSP acts as ethereum full node and connects to
the blockchain, while Google Firebase is used for the storage
of the data. The authentication and integrity of the data are
performed on the RSP and encrypted sensor data along with
the meta—data is upload to the Google Firebase in JSON
format. This cloud also performs proxy re-encryption and
updates the smart contract variable for data address sharing.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the experiments to evaluate
the proof of concept implementation. Experiments were de-
signed to study the performance of the framework. We have
performed multiple experiments to test the impact of proxy
re-encryption on the overall system and performed some
scalability tests.
A. Impact of Proxy Re-Encryption
In the first experiment, we measure the impact of proxy
re-encryption on the proposed system. The sensor encrypts
the data before uploading it to the cloud storage and later
re-encrypts it for sharing the data.
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Fig. 3: Impact of Proxy Re-Encryption
In Figure 3, the time of the different parts in the scheme is
illustrated. As can be seen, it takes on average 48.01 s to share
the encrypted data with the user after the initial request with
a confidence interval of 2.07 s. Consequently, adding proxy
re-encryption to the scheme increases the delay by 60% due
to the mining of the re-encryption key.
B. Scalability
In the second experiment, we measure the scalability of the
architecture by performing multiple transactions from multiple
requesters to the sensor. The whole process was repeated 10
times for each scenario before taking the average. In the first
scenario, only 1 request was initiated by the user and time
was measured from the request to the retrieval of data by the
requester. In the latter scenarios, the process was repeated by
increasing five requests until the overall request reached 50.
250'
 
Requests
Fig. 4: Scalability Test
As seen from the Figure 4, the process shows a gradual
increase in the delay due to the increase of transactions. This
increase in the delay is caused by the scalability problem of the
Ethereum blockchain. There seems to be a tradeoff between
speed and reward for the generation of the new block. The
number of transactions mined in a single block of Ethereum
blockchain depends on multiple factors such as gas price and
limit.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a blockchain based trading
platform with the combination of a paring free proxy re-
encryption scheme to ensure secure transfer of the sensor
data to the user. We have also validated the proof of concept
model on a private Ethereum testbed and demonstrated the
practicality of the system design using off—the-shelf laptops
and raspberry pis.
In the future, we plan to extend the proposed system with
an implementation on a different blockchain platform e.g.
Hyperledger. We also plan to extend our architecture by adding
a distributed cloud storage to make the system more scalable.
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